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Whose Reasonableness Counts?
Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997).
In late 1995, the city of Syracuse, New York, erected a nativity scene in
a downtown public park. The creche contained statues of Jesus, Mary, and
Joseph, a shepherd, a donkey, a lamb, and an angel. Hanging across the cr&he
was a banner that read "Gloria in Excelsis Deo," or "Glory to God in the
Highest." The creche was placed beneath a fifty-five foot Christmas tree, and
surrounded by sawhorse barricades reading "Roy A. Bernardi, Mayor." In
Elewski v. City of Syracuse,' the Second Circuit held that this display did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In assessing the Syracuse creche, the court employed the now-familiar
Establishment Clause "endorsement test."2 The court thus asked, "Would a
reasonable observer of the display in its particular context perceive a message
of governmental endorsement or sponsorship of religion?"' To answer the
endorsement question, the court relied on the perceptions of a "reasonable
observer" as defined by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.4 The court concluded that such a
reasonable observer would perceive the display, not as an endorsement of
religion, but as "a celebration of the diversity of the holiday season .. and
[as a means] to preserve the economic viability of downtown retailers."5 This
I. 123 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1997).
2. Id. at 54.
3. Id. at 53.
4. 515 U.S. 753, 778-82 (1995) (O'Connor. J.. concumng). The Second Circuit first adopted the
endorsement test, along with Justice O'Connor's definition of the "reasonable obscr'cr.'" in Crr'ator" v
Town of Trumbull, 68 F.3d 59. 61 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curtain), A Supreme Court majonty has not yet
adopted a formulation of the reasonable observer for endorsement test purposes
5. Elewski, 123 F.3d at 55. The Supreme Court has never upheld a religious display ow.ned and erected
by the government on public property. Cf. Putte. 515 U S. at 770 (upholding the display of a cross by
a private party on public property); County of Allegheny v. ACLU. 492 U S. 573. 621 (1989) (upholding
the display of a menorah owned by a private religious group at the entrance to a public building. Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (upholding the display of a goernmcnt-owncd crkhe in a park
owned by a nonprofit organization).
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Case Note argues that Justice O'Connor's formulation imports to the
reasonable observer the perceptions of a member of the religious majority, or
of an adherent of the religion on display, thereby rendering the endorsement
test insufficiently sensitive to displays of majority religious symbols. 6
I
The Establishment Clause endorsement test was first enunciated by Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.7 In Lynch, Justice
O'Connor wrote that government "[e]ndorsement [of religion] sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community."8 The Court employed
endorsement analysis in its next religious display case, County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 9 and indicated that endorsement' would be judged according to the
perceptions of a "reasonable observer."'
In Pinette, Justice O'Connor refined the test by attempting to define the
reasonable observer according to whose perceptions government endorsement
of religion would be judged." Justice O'Connor developed three themes:
First, the reasonable observer is informed about the community's general
practice with regard to religious displays and about the history of the forum
at issue. 2 Second, the reasonable observer is less likely to perceive
6. The Elewski court is not alone in its adoption of Justice O'Connor's version of the reasonable
observer. See, e.g., Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaylor v. United
States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1830 (1996); Americans United for Separation
of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1543 (6th Cir. 1992); Granzeier v. Middleton,
955 F. Supp. 741, 745-46 (E.D. Ky. 1997); Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 941 F Supp. 1465, 1476-
77 (N.D. W. Va. 1996). At least one court of appeals, however, has rejected Justice O'Connor's reasonable
observer in favor of the observer defined by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Pinette. See ACLU v.
Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1448 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2424 (1997); see also infra Part Ill.
7. 465 U.S. at 687-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 688.
9. 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989).
10. Id. at 620 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). In her concurring opinion in County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice O'Connor concluded, as the Elewski court did, that the reasonable observer
would view the religious displays as a celebration of cultural diversity rather than as an endorsement of
religion. See id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
II. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[B]ecause it seeks to identify those situations in which government makes adherence to
a religion relevant ... to a person's standing in the political community, the endorsement test necessarily
focuses upon the perceptions of a reasonable, informed observer." (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
12. See id. at 780-81. It is worth noting that much of the debate, both judicial and academic, over the
definition of the reasonable observer has focused on how much knowledge (for example, about the nature
and history of the community and forum at issue) should be imputed to the observer. Thus, in Pinette,
Justice O'Connor wrote that the "fundamental point of departure" between her definition of the reasonable
observer and Justice Stevens's definition "concerns the knowledge that is properly attributed to the test's
'reasonable observer."' Id. at 778. In Elewski, the court assumed that the reasonable observer would know
that the holiday display was encouraged by downtown merchants in order to attract shoppers, and that the
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endorsement of religion in government displays of historically "ubiquitous"
religious practices. 3 Third, the reasonable observer does not represent any
actual person but is the hypothetical expression of a community ideal."4
II
The endorsement test is "perspective-dependent."' 5 That is, because
endorsement is determined according to the perceptions of a reasonable
observer, the formulation of the observer determines when and whether
endorsement occurs.' 6 Crucially, religious symbols are perceived differently
by adherents and nonadherents of the religion associated with the symbol on
display. It is, for example, more likely that a Jew, Muslim, or atheist would
perceive endorsement in a publicly displayed creche than that a Christian
would perceive endorsement from that same cr&he.' Thus, Justice
O'Connor's definition of the reasonable observer too readily glosses over the
city had attempted to accommodate all requests for additional displays during the "holiday season." 123
F.3d at 54-55. The court also concluded that the reasonable observer viewing the crche would be aware
of a menorah, erected by a private organization, in a nearby park See id. at 54. For academic discussion
of the degree of knowledge that should be imputed to a reasonable observer. see. for example. Kent
Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Relgion Clauses. 1995 SUP CT
REv. 323, 371-74.
13. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J.. concumng) For a more developed discusston, see County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 630-31 (O'Connor. J.. concumng).
14. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779-80 (O'Connor J., concumng) (arguing that the endorsement test does
not "focus on the actual perception of individual observers." but on "the peispectise of a hypothetical
observer").
15. Developments in the Lan,-Religion and the State, 100 HARV L. REv 1606. 1647 (1987); see also
William P. Marshall, "tle Know It Vhen tie See ti"-Tie Supreme Court and Establishment. 59 S CAL
L. REV. 495, 533 (1986) ("[T]he meaning of a smbol depends on the nature of its audience -I
16. See Michael W. McConnell. Religious Participation in Public Programs. 59 U Cut L REv 115.
148 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Symbols. Perceptions. and Doctrinal Illusoons Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test. 86 MicH. L. REv. 266. 291 (1987). Laurence H Tnbe. Constitutional
Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency "'. 98 HARV L RE, 592. 611 (1985)
17. See Greenawalt, supra note 12. at 374 (noting that "since the majority (Christians) take their
cultural dominance so much for granted ... they may not pereee endorsement of their position"). Tribe.
supra note 16, at 611 ("When the government dons religious robes, those ,estments are least visible to
those who wear the same colors."); E. Gregory Wallace. When Got eninent Speaks Rehagioushs. 21 FLA
ST. U. L. REv. 1183, 1220 (1994) (IT]hose who arc sympathetic toward thlc] religious perspeetic [of the
display] will almost never perceive endorsement, while those swho do not share the perspective almost
always will.").
18. In Friedman v. Board of Count.y Comnissoners, 781 F2d 777. 779 (10th Cir 1985). the Tenth
Circuit took judicial notice of this tendency in its assessment of a county seal containing a Latin cross and
Spanish motto translated as "'With This We Conquer'- The court held that "lilt is to be expected that
members of Christian sects would be more comfortable with a seal endorsing their beliefs than would
individuals who adhere to different beliefs." Id. at 782; see also Robinson % City of Edmond. 68 F3d
1226, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Friedman. 781 F.2d at 782). Norman Dorsn & Charles Sims. Te
Nativit Scene Case: An Error of Judgment. 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 837. 858. John M- Hartenstein. A
Christmas Issue: Christian Holiday Celebration an the Publac Elementary Schools Is an Estabhshment of
Religion, 80 CAL. L. REv. 981, 1020-21 (1992) ("To non-Christians . thlel same Christmas display
immediately carries religious connotations."); Mark Tushnet. The Constitution of Religion. 18 C0%sN L
REv. 701, 712 n.52 (1986) ("[Ilt is difficult to believe that the Lsnch majority vould have reached the same
result had there been a Jew on the Court to speak from the heart about what public displays of crehes
really mean to Jews.").
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characteristic of the reasonable observer that most directly influences the
perception of endorsement. By relying on a "'personification of a community
ideal of reasonable behavior,"'" 9 the O'Connor formulation fails to resolve
whether the observer will have the perspective of one in the religious majority
or religious minority, and whether the observer will have the perspective of an
adherent or a nonadherent of the religion on display. It is impossible to
amalgamate, or average, these perspectives into one "hypothetical observer."20
Several components of the O'Connor formulation do, in fact, suggest that
this reasonable observer will manifest the perspective of one in the religious
majority, or at least the perspective of an adherent of the religion on display.
By requiring that the reasonable observer perceive the "history and
ubiquity"'21 of a religious symbol as negating its religious content, 22 the
O'Connor formulation determines that government displays of majority, or at
least common, religious symbols are less likely to be perceived reasonably as
endorsement of religion. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the "longstanding existence" of certain religious practices in
conjunction with their "nonsectarian nature" imply that such practices may be
deemed "secular" and thus do not convey an endorsement of religion.23 As
Michael McConnell has pointed out, however, "In our culture, most
'longstanding' symbols are those associated with Protestant Christianity, and
those most likely to be considered as 'nonsectarian' are symbols associated
with liberal Protestantism [and] symbols common to the Jewish and Christian
faiths." 24 Further, the religious majority may be more likely than religious
minorities to understand their own practices as "serv[ing] a secular purpose
rather than a sectarian one." 25 Thus, by equating ubiqfity with secularity, and
by allowing the perception of secularity to negate a symbol's religious content,
the O'Connor formulation of the reasonable observer renders the endorsement
test insufficiently sensitive to government displays of symbols associated with
majority religions.26
19. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 32, at 175 (5th ed. 1984)).
20. Id.; see also ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1448 n.12 (3d Cir.) ("[W]c note the nearly
impossible task of giving content to the hypothetical reasonable observer in our multicultural society."),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2424 (1997); Marshall, supra note 15, at 536 ("(The test remains
incomprehensible. Is the objective observer... a religious person, an agnostic ... a person sharing the
predominate religious sensibility of the community, or one holding a minority view?").
21. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 631.
24. McConnell, supra note 16, at 154; see also Developments in the Law-Religion and the State,
supra note 15, at 1658 (arguing that widespread acceptance of religious symbols indicates only the
"dominance of certain religions").
25. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Hartcnstcin,
supra note 18, at 982 ("[Wjhat the majority of Christian Americans consider secular is not religiously
neutral to non-Christians.").
26. Cf. Dorsen & Sims, supra note 18, at 861 (arguing that this "turns the establishment clause on its
head"); Tribe, supra note 16, at 611 (arguing that this "allow[s] society's insiders to characterize the
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Moreover, by not explicitly positing the religious perspective of the
reasonable observer, and by explicitly not relying on the perceptions of actual
persons, 27 the O'Connor formulation risks importing to the reasonable
observer the perceptions of the judges who apply the endorsement test. Judges
are asked to assess endorsement through the perceptions of a reasonable
observer who has no defined religious perspective. Therefore, the likelihood
that judges will conflate their own perceptions of endorsement with the
"reasonable" perception of endorsement is high.2
By skewing the perceptions of the reasonable observer toward those of the
religious majority or adherent, and thereby rendering the endorsement test
insufficiently sensitive to displays of majority religious symbols, the O'Connor
formulation subverts the goal of the test-forbidding government from sending
messages to nonadherents that they are outsiders to the political community. "
III
Given the problems that arise from the O'Connor formulation of the
reasonable observer, the Court should consider an alternative formulation. Such
an alternative is suggested by Justice Stevens's dissent in Pinette"' and has
been adopted by the Third Circuit in ACLU v. Schundler.31 Schundler also
evaluated a religious display owned and erected by the government on city-
owned property,32 and, as in Elewski, the court assessed the display according
to the reasonable observer's perception of endorsement." After noting what
it described as the "nearly impossible task of giving content to the hypothetical
reasonable observer in our multicultural society,"'' the Schundler court
message the outsiders receive").
27. See Pinene, 515 U.S. at 779-80 (O'Connor. J.. concurmng).
28. Cf. The Supreme Court 1988 Term-Leading Cases. 103 HARV. L REV 137. 235 (1989)
("[B]ecause the standard does not depend upon the perception of real human beings, and the inquiry is
undertaken devoid of any explicitly stated perspective, such as that of the reasonable nonadherent. it seems
inevitable that results will depend largely on the personal perceptions of the individual Justices."). ThIs.
too, skews the perceptions of the reasonable observer toward those of one in the religious majority. See
Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment. The Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government. 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 503, 517 (1992) ("Judges are themselves acculturated to a set of perspectives that
are emphatically not the perspectives of outsiders.").
29. Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668. 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor. J.. concurrng) (stating the goal
of the endorsement test). It is perhaps for this reason that the Elewski court was able to conclude that a
reasonable observer would perceive a government-displayed Christian nativity scene and a banner reading
"Gloria in Excelsis Deo" as a means to "preserve the economic viability of downtown retailers" rather than
as an endorsement of religion. See Elewski, 123 F.3d at 52. 55. But see County of Allegheny v. ACLU.
492 U.S. at 601 (concluding that the "Gloria in Excelsis Deo" banner conveys a "patently Chnstian
message").
30. 515 U.S. at 799-800 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
31. 104 F.3d 1435, 1448 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 117 S. Ct. 2424 (1997).
32. See id at 1438. The Schundler display consisted of a cr&he. a menorah. and a sign that read.
"Through this display and others throughout the year. the City of Jersey City is pleased to celebrate the
diverse cultural and ethnic heritages of its peoples." Id.
33. See id. at 1444. 144749.
34. Id. at 1448 n.12.
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rejected the O'Connor formulation of the reasonable observer, adopting instead
the observer defined by Justice Stevens in his Pinette dissent.
35
Although it would be possible explicitly to adopt a "reasonable
nonadherent" formulation of the reasonable observer,36 the Stevens model
incorporates the perceptions of the religious minority or nonadherent
implicitly.37 The Stevens formulation "extend[s] protection to the universe of
reasonable persons and ask[s] whether some viewers of the religious display
would be likely to perceive a government endorsement." 38 Because in our
"multicultural society' 39 this "universe of reasonable persons" necessarily
includes religious minorities and nonadherents, courts must consider the
perspective of a minority or nonadherent when answering Stevens's question
whether "some viewers" of the display would perceive endorsement.
By allowing the perception of endorsement by any viewer in the universe
of reasonable persons to mandate a finding of endorsement, the Stevens
formulation might result in the invalidation of almost all government-sponsored
religious displays.40 This, however, is not necessarily the wrong result.
Establishment Clause violations are assessed according to perceptions of
endorsement in order to protect religious minorities from being made to feel
that they are less than full members of the political community." Displays
should therefore be invalidated when a member of such a religious minority
reasonably perceives endorsement from the display.42 Had the Elewski court
employed the Stevens formulation, its analysis might have been more sensitive
to such reasonable perceptions.
-Benjamin L Sachs
35. See id. at 1448. Although the Schundler court devoted much attention to the degree of knowledge
of the community and forum properly attributed to the reasonable observer, see id., it also concluded that
"when testing for endorsement, we must take into account the perspective of those citizens within the
community who hold minority religious views." Id. The Schundler court held that such an observer would
perceive the display at issue as an endorsement of religion. See id. at 1449.
36. This formulation has been suggested by several scholars. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE.
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-15, at 1293 (2d ed. 1988); Dorsen & Sims, supra note IS, at 860-
61; Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 15, at 1647-48; The Supreme Court 1988
Term-Leading Cases, supra note 28, at 234.
37. Justice Stevens wrote explicitly that "[i]t is especially important to take account of the perspective
of a reasonable observer who may not share the particular religious belief [the display at issue) expresses."
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 800 n.5.
39. Schundler, 104 F.3d at 1448 n. 12.
40. See Smith, supra note 16, at 291.
41. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. As Kathleen Sullivan has noted:
[A]pplication of the "endorsement" test has been unsatisfying. Not to see the creche as sending
a message of exclusion to Jews, Muslims or atheists is to see the world through Christian-tinted
glasses .... But the solution is simple: Banish public sponsorship of religious symbols from the
public square. That the endorsement test has been ... unpersuasively applied does not mean
that it asked the wrong question to begin with. The Supreme Court should not eliminate such
a test from its Establishment Clause doctrine, but rather should more rigorously enforce it.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 207-08 (1992) (footnote
omitted).
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